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A fiduciary is a person who undertakes to act for the benefit of another person. He owes the 
duty of loyalty to beneficiary, is required to disgorge any unauthorized gain from his position, 
and has the burden of disproving his disloyalty in litigation. This article presents a theory that 
unifies a wide variety of human relationships as fiduciary relationships and explains how the 
law regulating these relationships works as a coherent legal system. Its theoretical foundation is 
the legal impossibility of self-contract, its analytical framework is a variant of trust game, and 
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   1 
1. WHAT IS FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP? 
Among many legal concepts in Anglo-American law, one of the most alien and therefore the 
most mystifying to economists is the concept of “fiduciary relationships.” 
Who is a fiduciary? A fiduciary is a person who undertakes to act in the interest of another 
person. It is immaterial whether the undertaking is in the form of a contract. It is immaterial 
that the undertaking is gratuitous. Indeed, in England where the courts of equity have 
always been strict in the enforcement of fiduciary obligations of a trustee, a trustee is 
ordinarily entitled to no compensation for his services unless it is otherwise provided by the 
terms of the trust. (Austin W. Scott (1949): 540-41) 
Examples of fiduciary relationships include guardian in relation to ward, trustee in relation to 
beneficiary, corporate manager in relation to corporation, agent in relation to principal, partner 
in relation to fellow partners, doctor in relation to patient, attorney in relation to client, priest in 
relation to penitent, and fund manager in relation to investor. 
The American Law Institute’s Restatement Third, Trusts has characterized a fiduciary 
relationship as one in which a person is “under a duty to act for the benefit of the other.”
1
                                                 
1Restatement Third, Trusts § 2, Comment b. Part I of DeMott (1991) is a concise case book on fiduciary law. Some of 
the well-known works on fiduciary relationships are Maitland (1936), Vinter (1938), Scott (1949), Sealy (1962, 1963), 
Marsh (1966), Jones (1968), Weinrib (1975), Finn (1977, 1989), Shepherd (1981a, 1981b), Frankel (1983,1995); 
DeMott (1988), Bishop and Prentice (1983), Clark (1985), Flannigan (1989), Cooter and Freedman (1991), 
Easterbrooks and Fischel (1993), Hart (1993), Hoyano (1997), Langbein (1995), Macey (1999), Worthington (1999), 
Alexander (2000), Sitkoff (2004). Shepherd (1981a): 53-73 and (1981b): 51-91 provide a comprehensive survey of 
competing theorizations of fiduciary principle by classifying them into unjust enrichment, commercial utility, reliance, 
unequal relationship, contractual undertaking, discretionary power, and property theories. See also deMott (1988): 
908-915. 
  Its 
Restatement Second listed as many as seventeen specific duties a fiduciary owes to a   2 
beneficiary, but Restatement Third has managed to consolidate them into “mere” nine. Among 
those nine duties the most fundamental one is “the duty of loyalty” – a duty that dictates the 
fiduciary to act “solely in the interests of the beneficiary.”
2  To borrow Benjamin Caldozo’s 
famous dictum, a fiduciary is held to “something stricter than the morals of the market place.” 
“Not honesty alone,” he asserted, “but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the 
standard of behavior.”
3  Such “ethical” tone of the fiduciary law is in marked contrast with the 
“economic” orientation of the contract law.
4  The classical paradigm of contract law was the 
bargaining of autonomous parties competent to pursue their own interests all by themselves.
5
                                                 
2 Restatement Third, Trusts §78 (1) states that: "Except as otherwise provided in the terms of the trust, a trustee has a 
duty to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries". See, e.g., Scott and Fratcher (1987): “The most 
fundamental duty owed by the trustee to the beneficiaries of the trust is the duty of loyalty. … A trustee is in a fiduciary 
relation to the beneficiaries of the trust” (311). A similar duty can be found in Restatements on Agency, Restitutions, Law 
Governing Lawyers as well as in Uniform Partnership Act, Principles of Corporate Governance, etc.     
 
When parties entered into a contract voluntarily and informedly with each other, they were 
bound by its terms, however unwise or unbalanced or unjust it might appear from outside, 
simply because it was the outcome of their free will and mutual consent. It was only when the 
contract was procured by fraud or duress or misrepresentation, or one of the contracting parties 
was a minor or lunatic, or the object of the contract was an illegal activity, the court could 
pronounce its unenforceability. To be sure, the modern principles of good faith and 
unconscionability have now restricted the contracting parties’ relentless pursuit of their own 
3 Meinhard v. Salmon, 249, NY 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928). 
4 See. e.g., Frankel (1983): 829-832, and Clark (1985): 75-79; deMott (1988): 882, 892-908. 
5 See generally Atiyah (1979).   3 
interests within certain limits.
6  Yet, the contract law itself has never gone beyond “the morals 
of the market place.” Each party to a contract is not expected to place the interests of the other 
above and over one’s own. Within the realm of contract law, “the right to act self-interestedly is 
being curtailed, not denied.”
7
Keech v. Sandford is the 1726 landmark English case in the history of fiduciary law. A trustee 
for an infant of a valuable lease sought to renew it but the lessor refused on the ground that an 
infant could not be bound by such a lease. The trustee then took the lease personally but was 
sued by the infant. Quoted below is the judgment of Lord King that the new lease must be 
held ]on trust for the infant on the same terms as the original one. 
  In contrast, as soon as a person places oneself as a fiduciary 
towards another person, the right to act self-interestedly is not curtailed but denied. It is indeed 
the essence of the fiduciary law that a duty to be “loyal to another” is imposed on the fiduciary, 
not as a mere sermon, but as a “legal” duty enforced by courts. 
I must consider this as a trust for the infant, for I very well see that if a trustee, on the 
refusal to renew, might have a lease to himself, few trust estates would be renewed to cestui 
que use (i.e., trust beneficiary). Although I do not say there is fraud in this case, yet the 
trustee should rather have let the lease run out than to have had it to himself. It may seem 
hard that the trustee is the sole person of all mankind who might not have the lease, but it is 
very proper that rules should be strictly pursued, and not in the least relaxed; for it is very 
                                                 
6 According to Uniform Commercial Code: “Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair 
dealing in its performance and its enforcement” (§205), and “If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any 
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract.” 
(§ 206). 
7 Finn (1989b): 82. See also deMott (1988): 892-908.   4 
obvious what would be the consequence of letting trustees have the lease on refusal to 
renew to cestui que use. (Sel. Cas. Ch.61, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 741.) 
Keech v. Sandford has since become the authority for the rule that fiduciaries cannot make a 
personal gain from their position. Lord King in effect obliged the trustee to surrender to the 
infant all the gain he earned from the lease, even if the infant himself could not take the lease 
and earn that gain by himself. This leads us to the second essential feature of the fiduciary law. 
When a party to a contract breaches his promise, he is liable to compensate the injured party her 
“lost expectation” -- the amount of money that would put the injured party in as good a position 
as she would have been in had the breach not occurred.
8  In contradistinction to this loss-based 
“compensatory rule,” the remedial rule for fiduciary breach is characterized by the gain-based 
“disgorgement rule.” When a fiduciary breaches the duty of loyalty, he is liable to disgorge to 
the beneficiary all the “unauthorized gain” -- the gain he has obtained from his fiduciary 
position without any authorization by beneficiary or courts or terms of arrangement.
9  Indeed, 
he has to disgorge all the gain, even if he has acted in good faith or with honest intentions, and 
even if his actions have not injured the beneficiary, nay, even if the beneficiary has gained as a 
result of his actions.
10
In deciding Keech v. Sandford the court did not even bother to seek the objective evidence of 
the trustee’s claim that he could not renew the original lease because of the beneficiary’s 
 
                                                 
8 See Restatement Second, Contracts: §344 (a) and §347; and Uniform Commercial Code: §1-106.  
9 See, e.g., Farnsworth (1985): “the disgorgement principle applies to breach of a fiduciary obligation while the 
expectation principle applies to a breach of contractual obligation.” (1356).  
10 Restatement Third, Trusts § 78, Comment on Subsections(1) and (2).    5 
infancy. The court simply accepted it, but nevertheless judged against the trustee on the ground 
that he placed himself in a situation that could conflict with the beneficiary’s interests. Indeed, 
it is such “strictness” of fiduciary liability that constitutes the third distinguishing feature of the 
fiduciary law. In the case of contractual relationship, the whole burden of proving the fact of 
breach is on the side of the promisee. By contrast, as is aptly put by Robert Cooter and Bradley 
Friedman (1991), “fiduciary law … infers disloyalty from its appearance.” (1055). Whenever a 
fiduciary is found to have earned an unauthorized gain or have placed him in a position that 
appears to compromise his duty to the beneficiary, he is held liable without further inquiry in 
courts or at least has the burden of disproving his disloyalty.
11
The law of fiduciary relationships has evolved in a complex historical process that originated 
from the practice of “uses” (the original form of trusts) in medieval England, formulated first as 
a set of rules that regulated the conducts of trustees, and later applied to persons occupying a 
“trustee-like” position, such as guardians, corporate directors, agents, partners, solicitors, 
priests, doctors, and even bankers.
   
12  The law has long been established as an important 
division of Anglo-American private law, and in recent years there has even been a tendency 
among jurists to plead the breach of fiduciary duty as an alternative to the breach of tort 
liability or contract liability.
13
                                                 
11 See generally Restatement Third, Trusts, §78. It calls this “no further inquiry rule.” 
  Yet, in spite of its long history and wide acceptance, it is a 
common claim among judiciary and academics that the notion of fiduciary relationships still 
12 See, e.g., Maitland (1936), Vinter (1938), and Sealy (1962) for historical evolution of fiduciary law. 
13 As has been reported and cautioned by, e.g. Sealy (1995), Hoyano (1997) and Worthington (1999).       6 
lacks a unified theory.
14  In fact, a number of fiduciary law scholars have suggested that the 
search for a unified principle must be given up once and for all. Since “[i]t is obvious that we 
cannot proceed any further in our search for a general definition of fiduciary relationships,” 
Len Sealy (1962) said in his classical paper on fiduciary relationship, “[w]e must define them 
class by class, and find out the rule or the rules which govern each class.” (73). Deborah deMott 
(1988), another authority on fiduciary law, concurred: “Recognition that the law of fiduciary 
obligation is situation-specific should be the starting point for any further analysis.” (878). 
Some in the school of economic approach to law have gone much further and even denied the 
very notion of fiduciary relationship as a distinct legal category.
15
There are only distinctive and independently interesting questions about particular 
consensual (and thus contractual) relations. When transactions costs reach a particularly 
high level, some persons start calling some contractual relations “fiduciary,” but this should 
  For example, Frank 
Easterbrooks and Daniel Fischel (1993) argued that efforts to come up with a unifying approach 
are “doomed,” because “there is nothing special to find … about fiduciary relations.”   
                                                 
14 There is no shortage of citations: “It is striking that a principle so long standing and so widely accepted should be the 
subject of the uncertainty that now prevails” (Finn (1989a): 25); “Fiduciary obligation is one of the most elusive concept 
n Anglo-American law” (DeMott (1988): 879); “[T]he precise nature of the fiduciary relationship remains a source of 
confusion and dispute”(Cooter and Freedman (1991): 1045); “[O]ne might have expected that … the nature, source 
and scope of the [fiduciary] principle were today well understood and the subject of widespread agreement. But this is 
not the case” (Flannigan (1989): 285); “Perhaps because the subject matter is so sprawling and elusive, there has been 
little legal analysis of the fiduciary concept that is simultaneously general, sustained, and astute” (Clark (1985): 71); 
“[T]he shape of the fiduciary concept remains uncertain, notwithstanding its deep historical tap root in equity” (Hoyano 
(1997) :179); “Also too well-known is the disappointing fact that none so far has satisfactorily defined the circumstances 
which give rise to the [fiduciary] obligation” (Worthington (1999): 506).   
15 See, e.g., Marsh (1966), Langbein (1995), Macey (1999), Alexander (2000), Sitkoff (2004), in addition to 
Easterbrook and Fischel (1993) to be quoted below.   7 
not mask the continuum. Contract law includes a principle of good faith in 
implementation--honesty in fact under the Uniform Commercial Code, plus an obligation to 
avoid (some) opportunistic advantage taking. Good faith in contract merges into fiduciary 
duties, with a blur and not a line.” (438). 
The present article is, however, yet another effort to develop a unified theory that is capable 
of combining a wide variety of fiduciary relationships into a distinct legal category. It is true 
that in order to mark “a line” between contractual and fiduciary relationships the mere 
extension of the principles of good faith or unconscionability in the law of contracts is not 
enough. As Paul Finn (1989b) has declared: “something more is needed.” (31). 
I now believe that there is a solid foundation upon which a unified theory of fiduciary 
relationships can be constructed -- it is a fundamental axiom in contract law that “one cannot 
form a contract with oneself.”
16
                                                 
16 See Restatement, Second, Contracts §9. “One may not contract with himself” – “this is,” as Thomas Schelling 
(1984) exclaimed, “a stunning principle of social organization and legal philosophy.” (99). See n.
  A contract with oneself, or more generally, a contract that 
amounts to a contract with oneself is a mere “vow” that is not enforceable within the realm of 
contract law. In Chap. 2 that follows I will characterize the fiduciary law as a self-contained set 
of legal rules, separate and distinct from the contract law (as well as from the tort law), that 
regulates a socially desirable relationship between two or more parties when and insofar as any 
attempt to form a contractual relationship between these parties could degenerate, at least in 
part, into a contract by one of the parties with oneself or into a contract that amounts to a 
contract by one of the parties with oneself. At its core lies a legally enforceable duty called the 
19 for a fuller 
quotation.    8 
duty of loyalty that dictates anyone, once he has agreed to enter into a relationship he is able to 
turn into his self-contract or its equivalent, to act solely for the benefit of the other. There is 
indeed a large class of human relationships that are socially desirable from the standpoint of the 
good of the general public or of the basic rights of individuals but that would easily turn into a 
self-contract by one of the parties if their formation were left to free bargains and contractual 
agreements. I count guardian/ward, trustee/beneficiary, corporate manager/corporation, 
agent/principal, partner/partner, doctor/patient, attorney/client, priest/penitent, and fund 
manager/investor relationships among them. It is the axiom of the legal impossibility of 
self-contract that enables us to unify a varied array of human relationships under the banner of 
the fiduciary relationship and draws a clear “line” between the law regulating these 
relationships and the law regulating contractual and other private legal relationships.   
It is of course one thing to define what the fiduciary law is but another to explain how it 
works as a self-contained legal system. In the rest of the article I will make an attempt to 
provide a coherent theoretical account of the three distinguishing features of the fiduciary law – 
the imposition of the duty of loyalty on fiduciary, the disgorgement damages for its breach and 
the strictness of fiduciary liability. For this purpose I will present in Chap.3 a simple model of 
fiduciary relationships whose formal structure is similar to the so-called “trust game” -- a 
one-sided “prisoner’s dilemma game” that has been extensively used in economics and related   9 
social sciences.
17
I will then examine in Chaps.4 and 5 the remedial rule for fiduciary breaches. Two alternative 
justifications have been offered in the past for the fiduciary law’s disgorgement remedy – one 
on the basis of deterrence policy (to prevent future harms) and the other from the perspective of 
corrective justice (to rectify past injustice). While the policy of deterrence is certainly able to 
rationalize why a fiduciary should disgorge any unauthorized gain from his position as fiduciary, 
it is at a loss to explain why the beneficiary is the one who should receive all the damages at all. 
For the damages awarded to the beneficiary will have no deterring effect on future fiduciaries; 
worse, it may even deteriorate beneficiaries’ incentives to take precautions against future 
breaches. The principle of corrective justice, on the other hand, is at home in justifying this side 
of the disgorgement damages, for its whole job is to rectify an injustice done. But, because of 
  The choice of a variant of trust game as the formalized paradigm of fiduciary 
relationships will enable us to analyze the structure of fiduciary relationships with the basic 
tools and concepts of economics and compare fiduciary law and contract law on the same 
footing. I will then formulate the duty of loyalty within such framework as an open-ended rule 
that obliges fiduciary to take whatever action a man of reasonable skill and judgment would be 
expected to take in maximizing the beneficiary’s net benefit. I will also present a possible 
objection to such deontological formulation of the duty of loyalty by the economic approach to 
law, but leave an answer to that objection only in Chap. 7.   
                                                 
17 See, e.g., Kreps (1990) and Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995). Cootner and Friedman (1991) have used a trust 
game in their theory of fiduciary duties.     10 
its intrinsic association with compensatory rule, the idea of corrective justice appears at first 
sight wholly unpromising as a justification for fiduciary law’s disgorgement rule. Yet, I will 
demonstrate that, once the duty of loyalty is accepted, its essentially open-ended nature 
automatically keeps disgorgement damages from exceeding compensatory damages. The 
gain-based appearance of disgorgement damages turns out to be a mere appearance, and the 
disgorgement rule is subsumed under the most venerable of all the remedial rules -- the 
loss-based compensatory rule.   
Chap.6 will deal with the evidentiary procedure for fiduciary breach. It will be argued that the 
strictness of fiduciary liability is the fiduciary law’s way to circumvent the inherent difficulty 
and in many cases the sheer impossibility of beneficiaries alleging and establishing the fact of 
fiduciary’s breach. It will also be shown that the fiduciary’s unauthorized gain still has a role to 
play in litigation, for its presence can serve not only as an incontestable evidence of fiduciary’s 
breach but also as a lower bound measure of the beneficiary’s lost expectation that is often hard 
to detect even by the injured beneficiary herself. I will close this chapter with a remark that, in 
spite of the exalting tone of Judge Caldozo’s dictum, the fiduciary liability is “strict” not 
because the duty of loyalty is “ethical” but because it is “legal” through and through. 
I will take up in Chap. 7 the economic approach’s possible objection to the deontological 
formulation of the duty of loyalty. I will argue that a fiduciary should not be allowed to breach 
the duty of loyalty to the beneficiary, even if doing so would enhance their relationship’s   11 
Kaldor efficiency. It is because in that situation the society could have achieved an alternative 
allocation that is equal in terms of Kaldor efficiency but superior in terms of Pareto optimality, 
if the fiduciary had chosen to purchase a right to serve the beneficiary as an outside third party 
rather than having exploited his fiduciary position within the relationship. I believe that even 
die-hard adherents of the economic approach would not object to our basic axiom that, when 
two alternative allocations are equivalent in terms of Kaldor efficiency, it is “wrong” to choose 
the one that is not Pareto optimal over the one that is. 
In the final Chap.8 I will call attention to the possibility of interpreting the notion of Pareto 
optimality as a deontological principle that every person has an equal right not to have his or 
her welfare be sacrificed as a mere means of increasing the welfare of someone else or of 
promoting the good of the general public. I will conclude the article by expressing a hope that 
the Pareto standard can serve as a common meeting ground between economic approach and 
corrective justice approach, more generally, between utilitarianism and deontologism in 
economic, legal, and other moral sciences. 
 
2. LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF SELF-CONTRACT AS RAISON D’ÊTRE OF 
FIDUCIARY LAW. 
One cannot form a contract with oneself — this is a fundamental axiom in contract law.
18
                                                 
18Restatement, Second, Contracts:§9 states that: “There must be at least two parties to a contract, a promisor and a 
promisee, but there may be any greater number.” Comment a then adds that: “In one sense a person can make a 
  A   12 
contract is an agreement between two or more parties creating obligations that are enforceable 
or at least recognizable at law. One is of course free to write a contract with oneself. But it takes 
two to tango. Within the realm of the contract law one cannot owe a legally enforceable 
obligation to oneself, since the second “one,” the one imposing obligation, could always release 
the first “one,” the one put under obligation, from the obligation, whenever one so wishes. A 
contract with oneself, or more generally, a contract that amounts to a contract with oneself is a 
mere “vow” that has “no standing at law.”
19
It is this legal impossibility of contracting with oneself that constitutes the fundamental 
raison d’être for fiduciary law. Indeed, I submit that the fiduciary law is a legal system that has 
evolved historically as a set of legally enforceable duties that regulates a socially desirable 
relationship between two or more parties when and insofar as any attempt to form a 
contractual relationship between these parties could degenerate, at least in part, into a contract 
by one of the parties with oneself or into a contract that amounts to a contract by one of the 
parties with oneself.   
 
                                                                                                                                                       
promise to himself, but the law does not provide remedies for breach of such promises.”  
19 Schelling (1984):“One may not contract with himself. This is a stunning principle of social organization and legal 
philosophy. One cannot make a legally binding promise to one-self. Or perhaps we should say that the second party can 
always release the first from a promise; and if I can promise myself never to smoke a cigarette I can legally release 
myself from that promise whenever I choose to smoke. It comes to the same thing. Charles Fried provided me with the 
name for what has no standing at law - the vow. The vow has standing if directed to a deity and is enforced by whatever 
authority the deity exercises. And the vow as an expression of intent can receive social and institutional support if it is 
recognized by an established church. Religious and fraternal orders differ from the common law in providing moral 
support, even coercive support, for vows like abstinence, celibacy, penury, and dedication to prayer, good works, and 
even heroism. But the vow has no standing at law.” (99). Schelling was one of the few who saw the importance of this 
“impossibility” axiom in law, though he has not pursued its implications fully. See also Fried (1981) at 40-43.   13 
There are indeed a variety of human relationships that can inevitably turn into a self-contract 
by one of the parties if their formation is left to free bargains. Examples include guardian in 
relation to ward, trustee in relation to beneficiary, corporate manager in relation to corporation, 
agent in relation to principal, partner in relation to other partners, and such professionals as 
doctor, attorney, priest, and fund manager in relation to their patient, client, penitent and 
investor. Let me explain them one by one, albeit briefly. 
(1. Guardian/ward): The simplest form of fiduciary relationship is between guardian and ward. 
A guardian is a person who has the legal duty to care for the person or property of another 
person (ward) who is a minor or mentally incompetent to act for herself. The guardian is given 
legal powers to exercise any, some or all of the rights of a ward, so that any contract the 
guardian forms with a ward would necessarily degenerate into a contract the guardian forms 
with himself. In Anglo-American law the guardianship can never emerge as a contractual 
relationship.    
(2. Trustee/Trust Beneficiary): The trust is the prototype fiduciary relationship. A trust arises 
where a person (the trustee) holds the legal title of property solely for the benefit of another 
person (the beneficiary). A trust may be created by an express intent of a third person (the 
settlor). But it can also arise without any settler. In the case of a self-declared trust a person 
declares himself a trustee for another person, and in the case of a self-settled trust a person can   14 
ask another person to be a trustee for him.
20  Moreover, in the cases of resulting trusts and 
constructive trusts, a trust is created by the operation of law.
21  What is impossible is the trustee 
and the beneficiary being the same person, implying that the essential core of the trust 
relationship is a relationship between trustee and beneficiary.
22
That a trustee/beneficiary relationship cannot be sustained as contract can be most readily 
seen if we take note the fundamental fact about the trust that for its creation neither the notice to 
nor the acceptance by the beneficiary is necessary.
 
23
                                                 
20 Restatement Third, Trust:§10 (c) and§43. See also Bogert (1987):§30 and§35.  
  The designated beneficiary may be in 
some unknown place, or may be a baby in arms, or even may yet be born, and no one is able to 
enter into contract with a person who is unaware of the fact that an offer is made to her or who 
is incapable of understanding the content of the offer or who is yet to exist in this world to 
receive the offer. To be sure that many of the trust beneficiaries are fully alive, mentally capable, 
and totally informed. But, even in those cases, the defining feature of trust relationship makes it 
impossible for the trustee to enter into a legally enforceable contract with his beneficiary. It is 
because the legal owner of the trust property is not the beneficiary but the trustee. The bargain 
principle of consideration in Anglo-American law of contracts postulates that only a contractual 
21 Restatement Third, Trust: 7-9 and§1 Com. e. See also Bogert (1987):§71. 
22 Compare with Langbein (1995)’s contractarian theory of trust that has dismissed the self-declared trust as occupying 
“a relatively peripheral role in modern practice” (627) because it “dispenses” what he regards “the most desirable 
attribute of the trust.” This of course amounts to assuming away the most critical attribute of the trust from his entire 
analysis from the beginning. As is asserted by Hayton (1996), “at the core of the trust” are “[t]he beneficiaries’ rights to 
enforce the trust and make the trustee account for their conduct with the correlative duties of the trustees to the 
beneficiaries….” (47). 
23 See Restatement Third, Trust,§14.    15 
promise that is bargained for something of value has “consideration,” hence legally binding.
24 
The trust beneficiary is deprived of any means of bargain with the trustee with respect to the 
benefits accruing from trust property, so that any contract the trustee designates her as their 
recipient becomes a mere donative promise that is not enforceable within contract law.
25
(3. Corporation/Manager): The law speaks of a business corporation as a “legal person,” as a 
subject of rights and duties capable of owning real property, entering into contracts, and suing 
and being sued in its own name.
   
26
                                                 
24 See, e.g., Eisenberg (1997) for the bargaining principle of consideration in the law of contract.    
  Even if a corporation has a full-fledged personality in the 
system of law, it is in reality a mere legal construct that is incapable of performing any act, 
except through the act of natural persons. In order for a corporation as legal person to buy or 
sell, lease or mortgage, use or maintain its assets in actual life, it has to have a natural person or 
a group of natural persons that performs such acts on its behalf. The law of corporation thus 
mandates every corporation to have a board of directors as the holder of the power to act in its 
name, and the board members often delegate part or all of their power to corporate officers for 
25 Since a contract for the benefit of third parties can be understood as a gift contract offered jointly by the contracting 
parties (the promisor and the promisee) to the third parties (see Fried (1981): 44–45) and it can do a part of what the trust 
does, the Anglo-American legal system might not have been able to develop the trust law so distinctively had not the 
bargain principle been dominant. It is perhaps for this reason many of Civil Code countries, where only a lawful cause 
(causa), not a consideration, is required for a contract to be binding, have long felt little need for the concept of trust. Yet, 
the critical fact is that contracts for the benefit of third parties can cover only a part of the legal acts permitted in the trust 
law. Some civil code systems (of Quebec, Luisiana, Japan, Taiwan, China, etc.) have incorporated trust law into them. 
26 § 3.02 of Revised Model Business Corporation Act states that: “every corporation ... has the same power as an 
individual to do things necessary or convenient to carry out its business and affairs…”    16 
the actual management of corporate activities.
27  (In what follows I will call both directors and 
officers as managers for short.) Can the corporation as legal person controls the performance of 
corporate managers by means of contractual arrangements alone? The answer is evidently “no,” 
for any act performed by a corporation is in reality an act performed by its managers. A 
corporation is unable to arrange a monitoring mechanism or an incentive scheme with its 
managers, except through the very managers it is supposed to control. This is indeed the very 
reason for setting up the so-called corporate governance system in the law of corporations.
28
(4. Principal/Agent): Agency arises when a person (principal) manifests consent to have 
another person (agent) to act on her behalf with respect to some task. Though most agency 
relationship is created by a contract between the principal and the agent, and though the 
principal has the right to control the goal of the relationship, the agency relationship itself is not 
a contractual relationship. Indeed, at the core of any agency relationship is a zone of acceptable 
acts the agent is authorized to perform without asking any consent from the principal, and any 
act the agent has chosen within this authorized zone binds the principal to third parties and third 
parties to the principal. It is therefore a tautology that the principal is unable to form contract 
with the agent with respect to acts within this zone, for the whole purpose of setting up an 
agency relationship is to delineate a zone of acts that are free from any prior contractual 
   
                                                 
27 § 8.01 (6) of Revised Model of Business Corporation Act, for instance, states: “All corporate powers shall be 
exercised by or under authority of, and the business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed, under the direction of 
its board of directors ….” See also §3.01 of Principles of Corporate Governance. 
28 I will come back to the problems of corporate governance in Chap. 6. This subchapter is based on Iwai (1999, 2002).   17 
specifications. ALI’s Restatement Second, Agency explicitly characterizes “agency” as “the 
fiduciary relation.” 
(5. Partner/Partner): Each member of a partnership is subject to the virtual veto power of 
fellow partners in any contractual decision that binds the partnership, because all partners have 
“equal rights in the management and conduct of the partnership business.” In fact, “every 
partner” is regarded as “an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its business.”
29
(6. Doctor/Patient, Lawyer/Client, Priest/Penitent, and Fund Manager/Investor): A patient 
treated by doctor may be totally unconscious, a client counseled by lawyer may be utterly 
unrealistic, a penitent guided by priest may be wholly devoted, and an investor having her 
assets managed by fund manager may be fully absorbed in her own business. And even when 
the patient is conscious or the client realistic or the penitent poised or the investor attentive, 
they are in general informationally dominated by their doctor or attorney or priest or fund 
manager in the sense that what they know about their own medical or legal or spiritual or 
financial matters is much less than what their doctor, lawyer, priest, and fund manager do.
 
30
                                                 
29 Uniform Partnership Act (1914): §18 (c) and§9 (1). 
 
Even if a patient, for instance, write a contract with a doctor that obliges him to choose the best 
possible treatment for her, there may be no way for her to tell whether a worsening of her 
condition is due to the doctor’s self-seeking choice of treatment or caused by an unlucky 
30 This should not be confused with the assumption of asymmetric information commonly made in contract theory 
where each of contracting parties knows his or her own actions or characteristics better than the other party does. Here, a 
doctor or a lawyer or a priest or a fund manager knows their beneficiary’s medical/legal/spiritual/financial states much 
better than the beneficiary herself does.     18 
circumstance in spite of the doctor’s most conscientious effort. The doctor is often able to 
misrepresent his disloyal act as if it were made in the patient’s best interests without any fear of 
being exposed to the light of the day.
31
In each of the above six cases, it is not the relative imbalance of bargaining power but the 
absolute lack of contractual capacity of one of the parties in relation to the other that inevitably 
turns an apparently contractual relationship between them, at least in part, into a self-contract 
by the other party. In any of these relationships, even if the latter party is willing to serve the 
needs of the former party, he cannot owe a legally enforceable duty to her, as long as they are 
confined to the realm of contract law. All that the latter party can do is to “vow” to act on behalf 
of the former party, that is, to unilaterally impose a duty on oneself for the benefit of the former 
party.   
  Indeed, Appendix 1 is devoted to a formal 
demonstration of how the doctor’s informational dominance over patient can endow the doctor 
with an absolute power to hide the sub-optimality of his treatment even if the patient can 
monitor his treatment and identify its result on her with certainty. 
To impose a duty on oneself for the benefit of the other is, of course, one of the Kantian 
                                                 
31 Darby and Karni (1973) have defined “credence goods” as goods whose qualities are “expensive to judge even after 
purchase.” See Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) for a set of the conditions under which the market mechanism is able 
to deter the suppliers of credence goods from exploiting the consumers’ informational disadvantage. They find, however, 
that in the case of medical services it is difficult to set up the market environment that satisfies these conditions, especially 
the verifiability of the treatment’s adequacy and even the identifiability of its quality. I believe legal, religious and some of 
financial services share the same difficulties for the market “solution.” In fact, the main purpose of Appendex 1 is to 
construct a model of doctor/patient relationship in which there is no way for patient ( and for that matter even courts) to 
verify the adequacy of the doctor’s treatment both during and after the treatment.         19 
formulae for an “ethical duty.”
32  But, we all know an unfortunate fact of human nature that 
ethical feelings cannot be counted as its richest endowment.
33
If, either for promoting the good of the general public or for upholding basic rights of 
individuals, a society wishes to secure the integrity of the above relationships each of which 
would inevitably turn into a self-contract by one of the parties, there is no other way but to 
leave behind the realm of contract law. It has to set up a separate system of legal rules that is 
able to impose on anyone, once he or she has agreed to enter into such relationship, the duty to 
act solely for the benefit of the other as a legally enforceable duty.   
  Some of the traditional 
“professions” have thus had recourse to group-imposed professional ethics (and group 
reputation) to supplement individual ethics. In medicine, the Hippocratic Oath has codified at 
least part of the ethical duties doctors owe to their patients, and in law and ministry (and in 
military as well) some forms of professional codes, while less explicitly stated, have also 
played important roles. But, it is awfully difficult to organize trustees, guardians, directors, 
agents, copartners into even the semblance of professional groups, and even in those traditional 
“professions” group-imposed codes have often proven to be insufficient to regulate their 
members’ misconducts.   
                                                 
32 Kant (1797) identifies “ethics” with “the doctrine of virtue” (6:378) and defines “a duty of virtue” as “an end that is in 
itself a duty” (6:383). He then asked: “What are the ends that are also duties?” and answered himself that: “they are one’s 
own perfection and the happiness of others.” (6:385).  
33 True that recent game-theoretic experiments have demonstrated that a majority of people have preferences that care 
the welfares of others (see. e.g. Rabin (1993) and Camerer (2003)). But what is crucial for us is the fact that a 
non-negligible fraction (e.g., 30 % among undergraduate students playing trust games in Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe 
(1995)) is also shown to act self-interestedly.    20 
That is the Fiduciary Law. Let us now see how it works as a legal system. 
 
3. A BASIC MODEL OF FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP. 
Let me introduce a basic model of fiduciary relationship in which a person (Mr. F) undertakes 
to act solely for the benefit of another (Ms. B). F is called the “fiduciary” and B the 
“beneficiary” of this relationship.
34
Let us denote by UB and UF the net benefit accruing to B and F, respectively. In the main text 
I will suppose that individual benefits (and losses) can be measured in terms of monetary unit 
and can be added to each other and subtracted from each other. This is, however, only for 
expositional simplicity. In fact, Appendix 2 will show that it is not hard to rewrite the whole 
article without assuming the comparability, to say nothing of the additivity or subtractivity, of 
individual benefits. I will also normalize the net benefits of both B and F by setting their values 
equal to zero when they remain strangers to each other. 
  In Appendix 1 I will formalize a model of doctor/patient 
relationship and show how it can be transformed into the one to be developed below, but the 
model itself has a much more generic structure that can encompass all the other forms of 
fiduciary relationship. 
The fiduciary law imposes on whoever has accepted to be a fiduciary “the duty of loyalty” -- 
the duty to act “solely in the interests of the beneficiary.”
35
                                                 
34 In what follows I will use a convention to call a fiduciary “he” and a beneficiary “she.”  
  In our formal model it may be 
35 See n.2 above.    21 
formulated as an open-ended rule that obliges F to take whatever action a man of reasonable 
skill and judgment would be expected to take in maximizing B’s net benefit, at least within the 
confines of the terms stipulated at the inception of the relationship. Of course, no one is ever 
forced to undertake to act as fiduciary. In order for F to take the position of fiduciary, he has to 
be fully remunerated for the costs and efforts he incurs in serving B’s interests, as long as they 
are “appropriate and reasonable” for his undertaking.
36
(1)  Max UB    s.t. UF ≥ 0 and other constraints stipulated by the terms of fiduciary 
arrangement.   
  By subtracting all these costs and 
efforts from F’s benefit, an incentive constraint on F becomes simply that his net benefit must 
be at least non-negative or that UF
 ≥ 0. The duty of loyalty can thus be formulated as 
The fiduciary law also imposes on fiduciary the duty of care -- a duty to exercise “reasonable 
care, skill and caution” in serving his beneficiary.
37
                                                 
36 According to Restatement Third, Trusts, “investing and managing trust assets, a trustee may only incur costs that are 
appropriate and reasonable in relation to the assets, the purposes of the trust, and the skills of the trustee.”(§90). This 
applies also to other types of fiduciary, except compensations to corporate managers. In §9, I will briefly give reasons to 
why managerial conducts are often given a special treatment in fiduciary law.   
  Though important and indispensable 
among many duties owed by fiduciary, this duty is secondary in relation to the duty of loyalty, 
for it makes no sense to ask whether the fiduciary exercises reasonable care, skill and caution 
when he is relentlessly pursuing his own interests. Moreover, the duty of care is not the 
37 Restatement Third, Trusts states: “A trustee will invest and manage trust assets as a prudent investor would, by 
considering the purposes, terms, distribution requirements, and other circumstances of the trust. In satisfying this 
standard, the trustee will exercise reasonable care, skill, and caution” in §90 that has incorporated Prudential Investor Act 
of 1992 with no substantial changes.   22 
distinguishing mark of fiduciary law -- it is in common, for instance, with the tort law of 
negligence. The rest of the present article will mostly ignore the issues concerning the duty of 
care and simply assume that it is duly observed whenever F acts loyally to B. 
Let (UB
*, UF
*) denote the benefits B and F obtain respectively when F observes the duty of 
loyalty to B. Our fiduciary, however, faces a possibility of conflict of interests with his 
beneficiary. Let (UB
0, UF
0) denote the benefits B and F obtain respectively when F is disloyal to 
B, exploiting the relationship with B solely to maximize his own benefit without having secured 
any authorization by B or by courts or by the terms of fiduciary arrangement. That both UB
* and 
UF
0 are defined to be the maxima immediately lead us to obtain the following inequalities 
between UB
* and UB




* ≡ B 0 U U Max
F ≥ ≥ UB
0 and UF
0 ≡ Max UF ≥ UF
*(≥ 0). 
Suppose that F has acted disloyally to B. Let us then denote by LB the monetary value of the 
transfer to B that would put her in as good a position as she would have been in had F acted 
loyally to her. It will be called B’s “lost expectation.” Let us also denote by GF the monetary 
equivalent to the net gain F has obtained over and above what he would have obtained had he 
acted loyally to B. It will be called F’s “unauthorized gain.”
38
                                                 
38 This definition of unauthorized “gain” includes not only the gross benefits F has earned but also the costs saved as a 
result of acting disloyally. This is the reason why we have called it the unauthorized gain, not the unauthorized profit.   
  When the net benefits are 
measurable in monetary unit, LB and GF can be calculated as the difference between UB
* and 
UB
0 and between UF
0 and UF
* respectively, or as     23 
(3)    LB ≡ UB
*–UB
0 (≥ 0) and GF ≡ UF
0–UF
* (≥ 0), 
though these two notions can easily be defined without assuming the measurability of benefits, 
as will be shown in Appendix 2.   
If both LB and GF are strictly positive, F actually faces a conflict-of-interests situation with B 
– once having entered into a fiduciary relationship with B, F is able to enhance his benefit over 
and above “appropriate and reasonable” level only at the expense of B’s benefit.   
Note that I will not suppose that UB
0 < 0 or that F’s disloyal act renders B into the worst off 
situation. In fact, if the worst-off scenario for B is to be betrayed by F after having entered into 
relationship with him, that is, if UB
0 < 0 < UB
*, our model would be identical with that of “trust 
game” -- a one-sided version of “prisoner’s dilemma game”-- that has been extensively 
employed in economics and related fields.
39  As has been pointed out in § 1, one of the 
conspicuous features of fiduciary law is the disgorgement rule for the remedy for breach, which 
entitles B to recover every pence of F’s unauthorized gain, even when F’s disloyal act has not 
injured B (i.e., UB
0 ≥ 0).
40
                                                 
39 Even before it was named the trust game, this type of one-sided prisoner’s dilemma game has been extensively 
explored as a model of “hold-up” problems in the theory of firm. See, e.g., Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978), 
Williamson (1985), and Hart (1995). Note that the trust game is one of the most frequently used game forms in 
experimental economics. See, e.g., Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) and Camerer (2003). 
  Any attempt to justify or criticize this gain-based remedy thus ought 
to be based on a theoretical framework that does not presuppose at the outset that the F’s 
40 Restatement Third, Trust referred in note 10 quotes the following remark by Borgert (1987): “Whether the trustee 
acted in good faith and with honest intentions is not relevant, nor is it important that the transaction attacked was fair and 
for an adequate consideration so that the beneficiary has suffered no loss as a result of the disloyal act. It is not material 
that the trustee himself made no profit from the disloyal act, although in most cases he has benefited.” (§95).    24 
disloyalty is necessarily injurious to his beneficiary. 
Some readers may have immediately objected to the above unabashedly deontological 
formulation of the duty of loyalty (1) on the ground that its reduction of F’s net benefit UF to a 
mere side constraint (UF ≥ 0) allows the relationship not to maximize the joint benefit UB+UF. 
For instance, Easterbrook and Fischel (1993) in the article already quoted claim that “[c]ontract 
and fiduciary duties lie on a continuum best understood as using a single, although singularly 
complex, algorithm,” for “ [w]hen actual contracts are reached, courts enforce them; when 
actual contracts are feasible, courts induce parties to bargain; when transactions costs are too 
high, courts establish the presumptive rules that maximize the parties’ joint welfare.” (446; 
italics are mine.) The economic approach to law often presents itself as a theory that the law, 
especially the common law, is best explained as a system of rules for maximizing “the parties’ 
joint welfare” or the relationship’s Kaldor efficiency.
41  An change in allocation is said to be 
“Kaldor efficient” if it would make at least one person better off without leaving any other 
person worse off if better-off persons could compensate worse-off persons in a lump-sum 
manner.
42
                                                 
41 See, e.g., Posner (1998): 26-29, 271-75; Polinsky (2003): 7-11, 158-162, and Cooter and Ulen (2008): 9-11,472-73.  
  Needless to say, if individual benefits and losses are measurable in monetary units, 
as we have so assumed in the main text of the present article, a Kaldor efficient change can be 
identified simply as a change that increases the relationship’s joint benefit UB+UF.   
42 A change in allocation is said to be “Hicks efficient,” if it would make at least one person better off without leaving 
any other person worse-off if worse-off persons could bribe better-off persons. The present article, however, need not 
introduce the notion of Hicks efficiency, though Kaldor efficiency and Hicks efficiency are equivalent so long as 
individual benefits are measurable in monetary units.   25 
Suppose that F happens to be endowed with a special apparatus or skill or knowledge that 
could be used as a complementary factor of the property or power or information or other 
resources B possesses. In such a situation, even if F exploited his relationship with B as a 
means of seeking his own interests, the synergy effect could improve their relationship’s Kaldor 




*. If this is indeed the case, breaching the duty of loyalty is 
a thing to be much recommended from the standpoint of Kaldor efficiency! Adherents of the 
economic approach to law might then say: “What’s wrong with the fiduciary’s breaching the 
duty of loyalty, if it enhances the relationship’s Kaldor efficiency?”   
One possible answer is that a fiduciary breach is wrong in the sense that it may set in motion 
a breakdown process of fiduciary relationships as a social institution. Suppose that F’s 
disloyalty to B would leave B worse off than not having entered a relationship with F, or that 
UB
0 <0. Then, fearing such possibility, many beneficiaries would hesitate to enter into fiduciary 
relationship in the first place, thereby aborting potentially productive relationships from 
forming. Even if the breach of fiduciary duty is efficiency-enhancing ex post, it is likely to 
result in inefficiency ex ante and lead to the demise of fiduciary relationships in the long-run. 
This is called a “hold-up problem” in the theory of trust game, and we now have a huge 
literature proposing a variety of formal and informal devices that may overcome such difficulty 
at least in part, such as reputation mechanism, monitoring design, collateral requirement,   26 
liquidation rule, etc.
43
Suppose that some of these devices have succeeded in mitigating the above ex ante 
inefficiency problem and keeping some of the potential beneficiaries from deserting from 
fiduciary relationships. Or suppose that some of the dishonest fiduciaries are, even without 
these devices, shrewd enough to refrain from exploiting their beneficiaries to the limit, leaving 
them barely better off than not entering into a relationship with them. In either event, B’s 
benefit is set equal to or slightly above 0. It is this value that would now define B’s net benefit 
UB
0 in the case of F’s disloyalty (as long as its value remains smaller than UB
*). “What’s wrong 
with the fiduciary’s breaching the duty of loyalty,” adherents of the economic approach to law 
might again say, “if it not only enhances the relationship’s Kaldor efficiency but also stops short 
of worsening the beneficiary’s position than before?” 
 
Yet, the fiduciary law is still adamant in condemning fiduciary’s breach of the duty of loyalty, 
even if his action has not made beneficiary worse off than before, nay, even if beneficiary 
herself has gained as a result of fiduciary’s disloyalty. Indeed, it is to account for this fact that 
our model has not supposed, as in the trust game has, that UB
0
 is strictly negative. How can I, an 
economist, defend the duty of loyalty (1) that may fail to reap as much joint benefit as possible 
from the relationship? I will, however, take up such task only in the penultimate chapter, after I 
have elucidated the basic principles that underlie the disgorgement remedy and the strictness 
                                                 
43 See, e.g., Hart (1995) and Laffont and Martimort (2002) for some of these devices..   27 
liability of fiduciary breach.   
 
4. DISGORGEMENT DAMAGES AS DETERRENCE POLICY 
It is “a principle of the law of contracts that damages for breach should be based on the 
injured party’s lost expectation.”
44  When a party to a contract breaches his obligation, the 
breached party is entitled to recover an amount that will put her in as good a position as she 
would have been in had the contract been performed.
45
(4)    D = LB. 
  Within the framework of our formal 
model, damages D according to this loss-based “compensatory rule” (or “expectation rule”) 
may be identified with what we have called B’s “lost expectation”:   
In contradistinction to this loss-based compensatory rule in contract law, one of the defining 
characteristics of fiduciary law is said to be the “disgorgement principle” in remedy of its 
breach.
46
                                                 
44 Alan Farnsworth (1985): 1341. 
  When a person in a fiduciary position breaches the duty of loyalty, the beneficiary is 
entitled to recover any gain the fiduciary has obtained through his position without any 
authorization by beneficiary or by courts or by the terms of fiduciary arrangement. Within the 
framework of our formal model, damages D according to this gain-based “disgorgement rule” 
45 Uniform Commercial Code, e.g., says that “the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party 
had fully performed.” (§1-106). This is what §344 (a) of Restatement Second, Contracts calls the “expectation interest.” 
To simplify the analysis, I will ignore what is called the “reliance interest” in the following discussion on the remedial 
rule for contractual breach.   
46 “[T] he disgorgement principle applies to breach of a fiduciary obligation.” (Farnsworth (1985):1356.) In addition to 
the articles quoted in n.1, see Laycock (2002): 585-603; Virgo (2006): 514-525.   28 
can be identified with what we have called F’s “unauthorized gain”:   
(5)    D  = GF.   
In fact, in the fiduciary law, even if F’s action has not actually injured B (i.e., UB
0
 = 0), nay, 
even if B herself has made a gain as a result of F’s disloyalty (i.e., UB
0 > 0), F has to disgorge 
all the unauthorized gains and convey them to B. 
The availability of disgorgement damages for fiduciary breach has been so well established 
that one 19th century English judge even went so far as to make the disgorgement damages the 
defining characteristic of fiduciary relationship.
47
Nevertheless, once we start to look for rationales given in the past for this form of remedial 
consequence of fiduciary breach, we immediately find ourselves on a disputable terrain. 
Although there have been many attempts to justify disgorgement damages either as an 
instrument of deterrence policy (to prevent future breaches) or on the principle of corrective 
justice (to undo a past injustice), neither attempt has so far been completely successful.
  Though this begs the whole question, it 
serves as a testament to the indisputability of disgorgement damages for fiduciary breach. 
48
I will examine the deterrence policy rationale first.
 
49
                                                 
47 “What is a fiduciary relationship? It is one in respect of which if a wrong arise, the same remedy exists against the 
wrong-doer on behalf of the principal as would exist against a trustee on behalf of the cestui que trust (the beneficiary).” 
Ex parte Dale & Co., 11 Ch. D. 772, 778 (1879) per Fry, j. 
  It is indeed almost tautological to say 
48 See references cited in n. 49and n 55, respectively. 
49 “In enforcing the duty of loyalty the court is primarily interested in improving trust administration by deterring 
trustees from getting into positions of conflict of interests.” (Bogert (1987): 341). Since there are many works on the role 
of disgorgement damages as an effective deterrent to fiduciary breach, I cite only few others: Scott and Fratcher (1987): 
323; Friedman (1980), 551-558; Cooter and Freedman (1991); Easterbrooks and Fischel (1993); Edelman (2002);   29 
that the gain-based disgorgement rule could strip the disloyal fiduciary of all his unauthorized 
gain GF, for its sole purpose is to disgorge all his unauthorized gain from the mouth of disloyal 
fiduciary. In contrast, the loss-based compensatory rule would fail to do so, even if F were 
caught in the act and paid the damages LB, whenever his unauthorized gain falls short of B’s 
lost expectation.
50
(6)     UF
0–  LB ≡ UF
*+GF–LB 
  This can be confirmed by calculating the net benefit of disloyal F when he 
pays the compensatory damages (4) and the disgorgement damages (5) respectively and 








(7)     UF
0–  GF = UF




While the loss-based compensatory rule (4) would even encourage any self-seeking fiduciary 
to breach the duty of loyalty, whenever F’s unauthorized gain GF exceeds B’s lost expectation 
LB, the gain-based disgorgement rule (5) would purge out of F any economic incentive to be 
disloyal to B, whether the unauthorized gain is larger than the lost expectation or not.
51
The deterrence policy justification of the disgorgement rule for fiduciary breach, however, 
  If one 
adheres to the policy of deterrence, this is the end of the story -- one cannot gain from one’s 
breach. 
                                                                                                                                                       
83-86, 212-216. 
50 Farnsworth, p. 1341. 
51 Note, however, that if we take into account of the difficulty of detecting all the incidences of fiduciary breach and of 
winning all the cases of litigation, the remedy based on the policy of deterrence should be set equal to R
D/p where 0 < p 
≤ 1 denotes the probability of detecting a breach and winning a case. See Cooter and Freedman (1991), 1051. In so far 
as this probability is less than one, the policy of deterrence has failed to justify the disgorgement rule fully.         30 
contains serious conceptual difficulties at least as a positive theory of law, especially with 
respect to its treatment of the breached beneficiary. To see this, let us note that the loss-based 
compensatory damages will by definition always make B full, or that 
(8)    UB
0+ LB ≡ UB




In contrast, the payment of the gain-based disgorgement damages will make B more or less than 
full, depending upon whether F’s unauthorized gain exceeds or falls short of B’s lost 
expectation, or 











On the one hand, whenever F’s unauthorized gain does not exceed B’s lost expectation, I 
believe few would disagree that the gain-based disgorgement rule (5) should be taken over by 
the loss-based compensation rule (6) as a remedial system. Although the amount of damages 
would be excessive as a deterrent, it would force F to internalize the efficiency loss his breach 
will inflict on the society. The remedial rule for fiduciary breach has thus to be revised in such a 
way that the damages payment is the greater of B’s lost expectation and F’s unauthorized gain, 
or 
(10)  D = Max [LB, GF]. 
This hybrid of compensation rule and disgorgement rule is precisely what the Uniform Trust 
Code has adopted in its remedial formula, when it says that “a trustee who commits a breach of 
trust is liable to the beneficiaries affected for the greater of:  (1) the amount required to restore   31 
the value of the trust property and trust distributions to what they would have been had the 
breach not occurred; or (2) the profit the trustee made by reason of the breach.” (Section 1002). 
The first part of this characterization of fiduciary liability is no more than B’s lost expectation 
LB, whereas the second part can be identified with F’s unauthorized gain GF. 
On the other hand, whenever F’s unauthorized gain exceeds B’s lost expectation,Ｆ’s 
payment to B of the disgorgement damages inevitably raises her net benefit over and above 
what she would have had but for the breach. That F should surrender all the ill-gotten gains 
may cause little uneasiness among us. But, that B would receive all the gains F has surrendered 
is a different matter. It is especially so because the disgorgement rule would reward B all the 
disgorged gain from F, even if B did not suffer from F’s breach (i.e., UB
0=0), nay even if B did 
gain as a result of F’s breach (i.e., UB
0>0). The disgorgement damages in excess of the lost 
expectation, GF–LB, thus appears a mere “windfall,” of which the beneficiary is no more than 
an accidental recipient.
52
From the standpoint of deterrence policy, is there any rationale for the beneficiary being 
rewarded more than she has lost? None, for the deterring effects on potential wrongdoers would 
not be generally dependent on whom the damages were rewarded. Of course, a keen 
  Why shouldn’t the court channel the amount of excess remedy GF–LB 
to people or organizations it believes more instrumental for the policy of deterrence or more 
worthy for the good of the society? 
                                                 
52 See, e.g., Jones (1968), 478. Shepherd (1981) went so far as to call the amount of remedy that exceeds the 
expectation loss a beneficiary’s “unjust enrichment.” (75-76).    32 
practitioner of the economic approach would evaluate the legal rule not only for its effects on 
the wrongdoers’ incentives but also for its effects on their victims’ incentives. But, this is totally 
a pointless exercise in the case of fiduciary relationships whose beneficiaries are beneficiaries 
simply because they absolutely lack capacities to form contractual relationships with fiduciaries. 
How can, for instance, a trust beneficiary who has not yet been born take precautions against 
possible breach of its trustee? More than that, such a calculation would only make the case 
worse. For what it would demonstrate is that, if potential victims were not totally passive agents, 
any compensation would deteriorate their incentives to take precautions against possible 
injuries, so that there should be no damage payment to the victims.
53
This leads us to look at the second rationalization of the disgorgement rule – the principle of 
corrective justice, for it postulates that the injurer’s duty to pay damages and the injured’s right 
  Indeed, when the amount 
of compensation gets larger, people may take too many cases to courts to bet on lucky success 
in litigation and may even choose to act vulnerably so as to induce wrongful conducts. If the 
deterrence policy is unable to justify even the traditional principle of compensating victims for 
their losses, it is totally at a loss to justify the disgorgement damages in excess of the lost 
expectation that appears a mere windfall to the breached beneficiaries.   
                                                 
53 See Polinsky and Che (1991) and Cooter and Porat (2002). Posner (1998), on the other hand, argues that it is only 
when the monetary amount of damages D would match the expected loss LB from their injuries (including litigation 
costs, risk premium, time preference, etc.) that potential victims would exercise an optimal level of precautions against 
injurious activities. (209). But his argument fails to take account of the possibility that, the higher the level of potential 
victims’ safety precautions, the lower the potential wrongdoers’ incentives to be lawful.     33 
to receive damages constitute “a single whole.”
54
     
 
5. DISGORGEMENT DAMAGES AS CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 
“The traditional argument for restoring plaintiff to his rightful position is based on corrective 
justice. Plaintiff should not be made to suffer because of wrongdoing, and if we restore plaintiff 
to this rightful position, he will not suffer. To do less would leave part of the harm unremedied; 
to do more would confer a windfall gain.”
55  The basic idea of corrective justice can be traced 
back to Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics but has seen a strong revival in recent years in the area 
of private law, especially in tort law, as the deontological alternative to the economic (or more 
generally the utilitarian) approach to law. Corrective justice is literally “justice as rectification.” 
Its whole purpose is to rectify a particular injustice that has occurred between two parties, i.e., 
between the injurer and the injured. In its modern theorization it is formulated as a simple 
deontological principle that, whenever a person breaches one of his primary duties to another, 
he should be imposed a secondary duty (also called a remedial or sanctioning duty) to restore 
that person to the position she would have been in but for the breach.
56
                                                 
54 Ernest Weinrib (1995): 143. 
  The injurer, in other 
words, has to pay the injured what we have called the lost expectation, and this is precisely 
55 Douglas Laycock (2002):17. The modern representatives of corrective justice approach are Jules Coleman (1995) 
and Weinrib (1995, 2000).   
56 According to Weinrib (1995): “When the defendant … breaches a duty correlative to the plaintiff’s right, the plaintiff 
is entitled to reparation.”(135), and according to Coleman (1995): “Corrective justice claims that when someone has 
wronged another to whom he owes a duty ..., he thereby incurs a duty of repair.” (32).   34 
what the compensatory remedy means.
57
Then, how can I use the notion of corrective justice as a rationalization of the disgorgement 
rule, if the remedial principle generic to it is none other than the compensatory rule, its rival? In 
fact, the only justification the corrective justice approach has so far been able to come up with 
is the supposed “property-like” nature of beneficiary’s interests entrusted to fiduciary.
 
58 
Needless to say, property rights give the owner not only the exclusive right to use and the 
exclusive right to alienate her property (that is, to transfer or to destruct her property) but also 
the exclusive right to enjoy the whole fruits from the use and from the alienation of her property. 
(These rights correspond to the ius utendi, the ius abutendi and the ius fruendi in Roman law.) 
Any gain a piece of property generates is as much within the entitlement of the owner as the 
property itself is. Hence, when a person has interfered with another’s property, any profit he has 
earned from the interference is as much a loss to the owner as the loss of the property itself.
59
If beneficiary’s interests from her relationship with fiduciary could really be treated as a piece 
of property or the like, we would be able to employ this logic of property right to justify 
disgorging unauthorized gain from fiduciary in breach. And yet, to treat many things as 
“property” or “property-like” that are not in the truest sense a piece of property as a 
rationalization of the legal practice of disgorgement damages for fiduciary breach is merely 
 
                                                 
57 Weinrib (1995): “Under corrective justice damages are compensatory …” (135, n. 25); and Coleman (1995) : “The 
principle of corrective justice” imposes on the injurer “the duty … to make good the victim’s loss…” (56). 
58 See Shepherd (1981), 93-123, Frankel (1983), 827, and Weinrib (2000), 141-142.    
59 See, e.g., Friedmann (1980), 504; Virgo (2006), 475-6.   35 
stating a conclusion, not a rationale.
60  In fact, in trust law jurisprudence there is a longstanding 
and often intense controversy over the nature of the beneficiary’s right between those who 
argue that the right of a trust beneficiary (cestui que trust) is a property right (or a right in rem) 
in the trust property and those who maintain that the beneficiary of a trust relationship has 
merely a personal right (a right in personam) against the trustee.
61  This controversy has long 
lost its heat, but has not completely died out. If it is controversial to treat the beneficiary’s right 
as proprietary even in the case of trust relationship that deals directly with a piece of property 
(trust property), it is all the more controversial to base the justification for the disgorgement 
remedy on the supposed “property-like” nature of the beneficiary’s right in other (trust-like) 
fiduciary relationships that have no hard “property” involved. It is for this reason that many 
judges and legal scholars who are otherwise unsympathetic to economic approach to law have 
endorsed the deterrence rationale when they come to explain the disgorgement rule in fiduciary 
law.
62
Is there a way to rationalize the disgorgement damages for fiduciary breach without having 
   
                                                 
60 Weinrib (1975): 10-11; Friedman (1980): 552-553; Easterbrook and Fischel (1993): 435; and Edelman (2002): 
192-193. Shepherd (1981) himself has pointed out two cases where the property theory breaks down completely, at 
53-56 and 278. The first is the case where a civil servant has to account to the state not only for the original amount of the 
bribe he took but also for the increased value of the property representing the bribe. It is virtually impossible to create a 
property concept in which the state as a principal is the beneficiary owner of a bribe to its agent. The second is the case of 
corporate opportunities. It has always been accepted that the taker of corporate opportunities cannot use in his defense 
the argument that the corporation could not have acquired the opportunity itself. 
61 See Waters, (1967) for this controversy. 
62 Daniel Friedman (1980) thus claims that: “Breach of fiduciary duty constitutes perhaps the most conspicuous area of 
application of deterrent principles to restitution [i.e., disgorgement damages]. It generally entails liability in restitution 
even if the fiduciary did not appropriate any “property” belonging to the beneficiary” (553).   36 
recourse to the property or property-like nature of beneficiary’s interests? I believe there is, and 
it is by going back to the very characterization of the fiduciary’s duty of loyalty. 
Let us first keep in mind that the beneficiary’s right in a fiduciary relationship is, at least at its 
core, not a property right (a right in rem) over her interests, but a personal right (a right in 
personam) against the fiduciary. In this respect, it is no different from the promisee’s right 
against the promisor in contractual relationship.
63
                                                 
63 Even in a contract for supplying a piece of property, what the promisee acquires by the contract in exchange for 
consideration is not a property right to that piece of property but a personal right against the promisee to his promise to 
supply that piece. (In other words, a jus in personam ad rem is a jus in personam not a jus rem.) To be sure, the contract 
right itself can be treated as a kind of property, to the extent that its content can be separated from particular personal 
relationship between promisor and promisee. In particular, the so-called choses in action, such as bank-accounts, debts, 
corporate shares, etc., can indeed be bought and sold or even borrowed and lent just like other ordinary choses (things). 
But the fact still remains that to have, for instance, a bank account is not to own a certain sum of money in the bank’s 
vault but merely to own a personal right against the bank to demand that sum. That a property right can be set up on a 
contract right does not transform the contract right into a property right; a contract right itself continues to be a personal 
right – a right against a particular person. 
  What fundamentally distinguishes the former 
from the latter is the content of the correlative duty. While the promisor’s duty in contract is 
confined to the performance of the promised act, the fiduciary’s duty of loyalty is essentially 
“open-ended.” What it dictates the fiduciary is only to act solely with the beneficiary’s interests 
in mind, with reasonable care, skill and caution, at least within the confines of the terms set at 
the inception of the relationship. In fact, even in the case of bare trust where the trustee holds 
the trust property to the order of the beneficiary, the trustee has discretion not to follow the 
order, if it would jeopardize the very interests of the beneficiary. In our formal model of 
fiduciary relationship, the duty of loyalty has been formulated as an open-ended rule (1) that   37 
dictates F to take whatever action a man of reasonable skill and judgment would do to 
maximize B’s net benefit subject to his participatory constraint, or as Max UB, s.t. UF ≥ 0. This 
means that whenever F’s pursuit of his own interests results in a failure of the beneficiary to 
reap as much benefit as she would have were the fiduciary to act solely in her interests, he 
should be regarded as breaching the duty of loyalty to her and subject to the process of 
corrective justice. (When the fiduciary fails to maximize the beneficiary’s benefit even if he is 
not pursuing his own interests, he should be regarded as breaching the duty of care.) I will 
argue now that this open-endedness of the duty of loyalty necessarily keeps the value of F’s 
unauthorized gain from exceeding that of B’s lost expectation.   
To show this, suppose that F’s unauthorized gain indeed exceeds B’s lost expectation or that 
GF>LB. It is then trivial to see that in such a situation F’s disloyalty to B would rather improve 
their relationship’s Kaldor efficiency, for F could still make himself better off without making B 
worse off (in fact, F could make both B and himself better off) even if he were to transfer a part 
of his ill-gotten gain to B. Formally, let P be a monetary value F transfers to B after his disloyal 
act. We then obtain: 






Note that this also implies that the joint benefit under F’s disloyalty is necessarily greater than 
the joint benefit under F’s loyalty, or that: 
 
                                                 
64 Appendix 1 shows this when no interpersonal comparison of individual benefits is allowed.     38 




*.   
We can go further. In that situation, even if F were to transfer all of his unauthorized gain GF to 
B, he would still be fully remunerated for the costs and efforts he has incurred as a fiduciary in 
the sense that UF
0-GF=UF
*≥ 0. This, of course, implies a contradiction! For F’s duty of loyalty 
is to promote B’s benefit to the maximum, and, as long as there is a way for F as a man of 
reasonable skill and knowledge to improve B’s benefit further without destroying his own 
incentive to serve B, what has been supposed to be his loyal act proves not to be truly loyal at 
all. What F should do to fulfill his duty of loyalty is to earn the gain GF (temporarily at B’s 
expense) but transfer it fully to B, thereby promoting B’s benefit to the level higher than the 
supposed maximum UB
*. If we keep the notational convention to place an asterisk (*) on the 
variables in the case of loyalty, we now have to redefine UB
*(≡ B 0 U U Max




0–GF respectively, though the latter being by definition equal to the original UF
*. 
It follows that, whenever F’s unauthorized gain exceeds B’s lost expectation, the gain F earns 
from the relationship without authorization is what B would have had had F acted loyally. In 
other words, F’s unauthorized gain now becomes equal to B’s lost expectation, or   




0 = GF.   
The situation is somewhat similar to Zeno’s story of Achilles and the tortoise. The moment F’s 
unauthorized gain exceeds B’s lost expectation, we have to redefine what constitutes F’s loyal 
act and adjust the value of B’s lost expectation by adding to it the excess of F’s unauthorized   39 
gain, thereby making them equal with each other. Under the fiduciary principle (1) F’s 
unauthorized gain can never exceed B’s lost expectation, that is, 
(13)    GF ≤ LB. 
It should be noted that the above argument by no means implies that F should increase B’s 
net benefit over and above the level a man of reasonable skill and judgment is able to do. There 
is nothing in the fiduciary principle that obliges or even encourages F to do so, even if F 
happens to be endowed with special capability that has a synergy effect with B’s resources. Any 
above-normal benefit F bestows on B should be regarded as F’s purely voluntary act of 
donation to B. In any case, if F has actually earned an unauthorized gain above and over the 
reasonable and appropriate level by having served B as her fiduciary, that gain should be treated 
as belonging to B. 
We have already revised in (10) the remedial rule for fiduciary breach in such a way that 
when F’s unauthorized gain fails to exceed B’s lost expectation, F has to compensate B fully for 
her lost expectation above and over his unauthorized gain. We have now seen that F’s 
unauthorized gain can never exceed B’s lost expectation by the very open-ended nature of the 
duty F owes to B, because the moment F’s unauthorized gain has exceeded B’s lost expectation, 
F’s duty of loyalty entitles B to receive this excess gain so that the value of B’s lost expectation 
will be automatically raised to that of F’s unauthorized gain. To be sure, F has to disgorge every 
penny of his ill-gotten gains in such situation, but what F has to disgorge is no more than the   40 
compensation of what B has lost as a result of F’s breach. In sum, we have: 
(14)  D = Max[GF, LB] = LB. 
We have thus succeeded in eliminating any windfall element from the damages awarded to 
the beneficiary in the law of fiduciary. This resolution, however, has come at substantial price. 
For we have at the same time lost as an independent remedial rule the very disgorgement rule 
we have been trying to rationalize. Indeed, all that we need is the most venerable of all the 
remedial rules – the compensatory rule that obliges the injuring party to compensate the injured 
party for the amount of her lost expectation. The gain-based appearance of the disgorgement 
remedy (5) is a mere appearance – the fiduciary’s unauthorized gain GF has to be disgorged 
only because it constitutes a part, or at most the whole, of the beneficiary’s lost expectation LB. 
Even in the case of fiduciary’s breach of the duty of loyalty, the basic remedial principle 
remains to be compensatory, as in the case of contractual breach.
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While this conclusion brings the old-fashioned idea of corrective justice back to life as a 
justificatory principle for the fiduciary law’s remedial rule, its resurrection of the deterrence 
policy justification is only partial. To be sure, the compensatory rule (4) can now function also 
as a deterrent to future disloyalty of potential fiduciaries, because it has absorbed the 
disgorgement rule (5) as its part. But, the deterrence policy per se is still incapable of justifying 
  The fiduciary law is 
certainly anti-contractual, but its remedial rule is far from being anti-compensatory.   
                                                 
65 This remark may cast a serious doubt on the necessity of the concept of “restitution” in the area of private law.   41 
why the beneficiary has to be the recipient of even a part of the fiduciary’s damages payment 
for his breach of fiduciary duty. 
More important is the fact that our explanation of the seemingly gain-based feature of the 
remedial rule for fiduciary law is based solely on the open-ended nature of the duty of loyalty 
without having presupposed the “property” or “property-like” nature of the interests the 
relationship with F provides B with. B is entitled to any unauthorized gain F has earned from 
his relationship with her, not because B has a “property” or “property-like” right to her interests, 
but because B’s right correlative to F’s duty of loyalty is an open-ended right to any benefit F 
generates from the relationship. Indeed, if B’s opportunities to benefit from the relationship 
appear to be “property-like,” it is the result, not the reason, of the necessity to disgorge F of his 
unauthorized gain for compensatory purpose.
66
Gareth Jones once remarked that: “to compel a fiduciary, who has proved his honesty beyond 
doubt and has acted in his principal’s best interests, to account for profit made at the expense of 
a third party is less easily justifiable particularly if the principal has also benefited through the 
   
                                                 
66 This is in perfect conformity with the following observation by Edelman (2002): “It was once thought that liability 
for breach of fiduciary duty was based in notions of property. However, any doubts were resolved in Attorney General 
for Hong Kong v. Reid, where the Privy Council made it clear that fiduciary liability was independent of any question of 
interference with property held by the fiduciary. ... The breach of fiduciary duty in that case – receiving bribes – clearly 
did not involve property of the claimant (principal).” (192-193). This, however, leaves us one loose end to tie up. It is the 
fact that, in spite of the longstanding controversy as to the personal/proprietary nature of the beneficiary’s right in trust 
relationship, the modern tendency is to make it essentially “proprietary” or “proprietary-like.” (See, for instance, Borgart 
(1987), sec. 37, or Penner (2002), sec. 2-34.) How can we reconcile this fact with our premise that the beneficiary’s right 
in the fiduciary relationship, which of course includes the trust relationship, is at least in its core a personal right against 
the fiduciary? I need another paper to answer this question.   42 
fiduciary’s actions” than to make “a foolish but honest fiduciary” liable for a real loss suffered 
by the beneficiary through his act or omission, even though he has made no gain.
67
 
  But what 
we have seen is that, whenever a fiduciary has pocketed an unauthorized gain, he has, by the 
very characteristics of the fiduciary duty, not acted in his beneficiary’s best interests, even 
though the beneficiary benefited from his conduct. 
6. STRICTNESS OF FIDUCIARY LIABILITY. 
Fiduciary law imposes on anyone who has accepted the position of fiduciary the primary duty 
of loyalty towards beneficiary. Fiduciary law also imposes on any fiduciary who has breached 
that duty the secondary duty of compensation to the beneficiary. To make our analysis of the 
fiduciary law self-contained, I now have to describe an evidentiary procedure that determines 
whether a fiduciary has indeed breached the duty of loyalty or not.   
In order to bring an action, the plaintiff must have a “cause” that will entitle her to obtain a 
remedy in court from the defendant. In the case of a contractual breach, it is the plaintiff who 
must allege and prove the fact of breach.
68  Unless she can show with “reasonable certainty” 
that she has been harmed by the defendant’s breach, the plaintiff may not be rewarded, at least 
in full, the damages for her loss.
69
                                                 
67 Jones, 484. (Italics are mine.) 
  That the burden of proof is on the plaintiff is justifiable 
68 See, e.g., Corbin (1952): § 1228. 
69 See Restatement Second, Contracts §360 comment b: “If the injured party has suffered loss but cannot sustain the 
burden of proving it, only nominal damages will be awarded.”   43 
either on the basis of economic analysis or on the basis of corrective justice. From the 
economic standpoint, the promisee who has suffered the loss is the most efficient source of 
evidence with regard to the breach and has a full incentive to seek damages against the 
promisor in court. From the corrective justice standpoint, the promisee whose primary right is 
breached should be awarded a secondary right to damages as rectification of an injustice 
inflicted by the promisor and should be responsible to produce evidence in order to affirm that 
right in courts.   
Yet, once we have entered into the realm of fiduciary relationships, we see immediately that 
there is no chance for such evidentiary procedure to work. Since the very raison d’être of 
setting up a fiduciary relationship lies in the beneficiary’s absolute lack in capacity to form 
contract with the fiduciary, it is often impossible, usually impractical, and almost always 
ineffectual to have the beneficiary to allege and prove the fact of breach.
70
                                                 
70 See, e.g., Flannigan (2006). Flannigan (1990) at 46 quotes the following remark by Lord Eldon on Ex parte Lacey: 
“It is founded upon this: that though you may see in a particular case, that he has not made advantage, it is utterly 
impossible to examine upon satisfactory evidence in the power of the Court, by which I mean, in the power of the 
parties, in ninety-nine cases out of an hundred, whether he has made an advantage, or not.”   
  A ward needs a 
guardian just because she is a minor or mentally incompetent. A trust beneficiary may not be 
informed or may not be intelligent or may yet be born; and even when she were alive, 
intelligent, and informed, the fact that the legal owner of the trust property is not the beneficiary 
but the trustee would give the trustee ample means to disguise his transactions with regard to 
the trust property as if it were for the beneficiary’s best interests. A corporation under the   44 
management of directors and officers has only a legal personality that has no natural capacity to 
do anything, let alone to allege and prove the fact of managerial breach. A principal is incapable 
of monitoring her agent who is representing her in a deal with third parties in her absence, and 
even if she hires the second agent to monitor the first agent she is then unable to monitor that 
monitoring agent. Members of a partnership are also incapable of monitoring every detail of her 
fellow partners’ conducts because they have to divide their work through specialization. A 
patient, a client, a devotee, and an investor may be unconscious or unrealistic or infatuated or 
occupied; and even if the patient were conscious, the client were realistic, the devotee were 
poised, and the investor were attentive, the doctor, the lawyer, the priest, and the fund manager 
could easily exploit their informational dominance over their beneficiary to structure their 
self-seeking actions as if they were for the sake of the beneficiary. (See again Appendix 1 for 
the formal proof of this claim.)     
Fiduciary law has, through a long historical process, “solved” this problem of evidentiary 
procedure, albeit imperfectly, by making the fiduciary liability strictly “strict.” It starts from a 
formalization of the duty of loyalty as a set of rules that fiduciary has to observe externally – “a 
fiduciary (a) cannot use his position to his own or to a third party’s advantage; or (b) cannot, in 
any manner within the scope of his service, have a personal interest or an inconsistent 
engagement with a third party – unless this is freely and informedly consented to by the 
beneficiary or is authorized by law.” (Finn (1989a) at 27). The former rule that disentitles a   45 
fiduciary to earn unauthorized gain or secret profit from his position is called “the profit rule” 
and the latter that disallows a fiduciary to place himself in a position where his own interest 
conflicts his duty to the beneficiary “the conflict rule”. What these rules implicitly tell the 
fiduciary is that the courts do not delve into his internal state of mind in determining a breach. 
All that is required of the fiduciary is the external “appearance” of conforming to the duty of 
loyalty. But that requirement also implies that any act of the fiduciary that “appears” to have 
compromised the undivided loyalty to the beneficiary is presumed to have breached the duty 
itself, unless it is freely and informedly consented by the fiduciary or is approved by courts or 
authorized by the terms of fiduciary arrangement. It is immaterial whether the action in 
question was taken in good faith, or the terms of transactions were fair, or no harm resulted to 
the beneficiary.
71
It is true that in the United States and several other countries the strictness of the fiduciary 
liability has been relaxed at least for corporate managers. Managers may now be able to justify 
his self-interested transaction, as long as it is proved to be fair to the corporation, even without 
  Indeed, once a fiduciary is alleged to have violated one of the rules, either he 
is held to be liable without any defense allowed in courts, or, more often the case, he has the 
burden of proving his loyalty against the contrary appearance. The whole purpose of subjecting 
the fiduciary to such “strict” liability is to surmount the intrinsic difficulty of determining the 
fact of breach in the fiduciary relationship. 
                                                 
71 See again Restatement Third, Trusts, §78, Comment on (1) and (2), quoted in n. 10.   46 
any authorization by courts, nay, even in the absence of any approval by disinterested 
managers.
72  This, however, should not be taken as a denial of the evidentiary procedure’s basic 
presumption, because in the case of corporate managers the so-called corporate governance 
system regulates the behavior of managers not only by imposing fiduciary duties on them but 
also by encouraging a variety of stakeholders to monitor their activities and hold them 
accountable. The derivative action permits individual shareholders to sue on behalf of their 
corporation when managers are believed to have violated fiduciary duties; the board of 
directors in a publicly held corporation must have a certain number of directors (a majority in 
the case of a large publicly held corporation) who are free of any significant relationship with 
its senior managers in order to restrain the latter’s potential self-dealing or conflict of interest 
transactions; there are “voices” of core employees, main banks, long-term suppliers, regular 
customers, local communities, etc. that may be able to check the managers’ performances from 
inside and outside of the corporate organization; and the stock market is also expected to 
function as a “market for corporate control” especially for dispersedly owned public 
corporations.
73
                                                 
72 See Marsh (1966) for the evolution of the manner in which American courts have interpreted the duty of loyalty, 
especially for that of corporate managers. See generally Principle of Corporate Governance, especially Part V. 
  It is to the extent that these supplementary devices are available, and only to 
that extent, that a certain relaxation of the strict liability has been permitted for fiduciary breach 
of corporate managers. The fiduciary liability should be kept strict in other fiduciary 
73 See again Principle of Corporate Governance. See Iwai (1999, 2002) for more detailed discussion on these 
supplementary corporate governance mechanisms on the basis of corporate theory.   47 
relationships unless there is a room for non-beneficiaries to assist the beneficiary to prove the 
fact of breach. In any case, even in the relationship between corporation and its managers it is 
still the managers who have to bear the burden of proving the fairness of their transactions. 
There has been a debate as to whether the profit rule and the conflict rule are the same thing 
or two separate rules.
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It is one thing to prove the fact of fiduciary’s breach but quite another to measure the amount 
of beneficiary’s lost expectation. Even when a breach is successfully proved, the beneficiary as 
well as courts would still be left with equally daunting problem of measuring “with reasonable 
certainty” the amount of damages LB the beneficiary has suffered from the breach. This is 
especially difficult in the case of professional relationships, such as doctor and patient, lawyer 
and client, priest and devotee, and fund manager and investor, where the effects of 
  Leaving aside its historical origin as the ancient prohibition against 
compensations to fiduciary, the profit rule is evidently a corollary of the conflict rule. 
Whenever a fiduciary makes a gain from his position without any consent or authorization, he 
certainly has “a personal interest or an inconsistent engagement with a third party.” A violation 
of the profit rule is necessarily a violation of the conflict rule. Yet, I believe, there is a reason to 
have the profit rule presented separately from the conflict rule. It is that the fiduciary’s 
unauthorized gain GF may serve as a surrogate measure of the beneficiary’s damages suffered 
from the breach. 
                                                 
74 Shepherd (1981b): 147-151.   48 
professional’s actions are beset with so large an uncertainty that the most conscientious effort 
may end up with the worst situation and the totally self-interested performance may give rise to 
the best possible outcome. An aggravation of symptoms, for instance, is not always a sign of 
doctor’s choice of suboptimal treatment, nor an improvement an indication of his loyalty to the 
patient’s interests. The patient’s lost expectation is positive only in the sense of statistical 
average, and there may be a non-negligible probability that the realized medical benefit from a 
suboptimal treatment turns out to be better than the medical benefit expected from the optimal 
treatment.
75
If it were in the realm of contract law, this would mark the end of the story -- no damages will 
be awarded to the beneficiary unless she herself cannot show the evidence of her lost 
expectation. But, since the law of fiduciary relationships has turned the table around and placed 
the burden of proof on the fiduciary’s shoulders, there remains an important piece of 
information that can still be exploited effectively. It is the fiduciary’s unauthorized gain GF. In 
so far as it is not of psychic nature, it is often observable by the beneficiary, or, if she is 
incapable, by well-informed third parties including courts. Especially if the gain is in the form 
of excessive compensation or abnormal price or kickback, it is not easy for fiduciary to hide it 
from the eyes of others. Since we have already shown in (13) that by the open-ended nature of 
the duty of loyalty the fiduciary’s unauthorized gain can never exceed the beneficiary’s lost 
   
                                                 
75 Appendix 1 demonstrates this fact in a formal model of doctor/patient relationship.   49 
expectation, or GF ≤ LB, not only its presence can serve as the sure evidence of the fiduciary’s 
breach but also its amount as the lower bound measure of the beneficiary’s lost expectation. 
Whenever a fiduciary is found to have earned an unauthorized gain GF, his beneficiary is 
automatically entitled to receive at least that amount from the fiduciary as a compensation for 
her lost expectation LB. Although the gain-based disgorgement remedy has been subsumed 
under the loss-based compensatory remedy, the fiduciary’s unauthorized gain has thus been 
shown to have still an important role to play in the evidentiary procedure in fiduciary law.   
Let us now go back to Judge Caldozo’s famous dictum quoted in Chap.1: “a [fiduciary] is 
held to something stricter than the morals of the market place.” Most commentators have 
interpreted this as a command of ethicality or altruism on fiduciary. But they then miss the 
fundamental fact about fiduciary law. In spite of its highly exalting tone, what Judge Caldozo 
exalted is not the virtuousness of fiduciary’s internality but the “strictness” of his external 
adherence to the rules of conduct. To be sure, “not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor 
the most sensitive” is demanded of fiduciary, but it was not as to his state of mind but as to his 
“standard of behavior.” Indeed, the very essence of the fiduciary law is to impose on any person 
in the position of fiduciary the duty to act loyally to another as legally enforceable duties. The 
duty of loyalty is therefore not an ethical duty at all but a legal duty per excellence.
76
                                                 
76 I thus agree with deMott (1992): “the duty to act loyally is one imposed by the law in particular relationships ... In 
contrast, in its conventional sense, altruistic [or ethical] action is self-willed, not compelled by law.” (478)  
  For what 
distinguishes an ethical duty from a legal one is that while the latter is subject to external   50 
constraint by courts, the former is subject only to individual’s free self-constraint. An ethical 
duty ceases to be “ethical” the moment it becomes a duty coerced from outside.   
Of course, fiduciaries are free to internalize the duty of loyalty as an ethical duty, and Judge 
Caldozo’s dictum and the like have certainly helped many fiduciaries to fulfill their duty out of 
their self-imposed motivation. But, this does not change the fact that the duty of loyalty in itself 
is a legal duty enforced externally by courts. In fact, the intrinsic difficulty of proving the fact 
of fiduciary breach has driven the fiduciary law to the very limit of the legality by requiring the 
fiduciary only of external conformity with the profit and conflict rules and at the same time 
presuming any “appearance” of disloyalty as evidence of a breach of the duty of loyalty. The 
fiduciary liability is “strict” not because the fiduciary law is “ethical” but because it is “legal” 
through and through. 
 
7. “ECONOMIC”JUSTIFICATION OF FIDUCIARY PRINCIPLES   
I left Chap.3 without having answered the economic approach’s possible criticism of our 
deontological formulation of the duty of loyalty (1) that its reduction of fiduciary’s net benefit 
to a mere side constraint may fail to maximize the joint benefit between B and F. What’s wrong 
with the fiduciary’s breaching the duty of loyalty, if it enhances the relationship’s Kaldor 
efficiency?   
It is true that we have demonstrated in Chap.5 that, whenever F’s unauthorized gain GF   51 
exceeds B’s lost expectation LB, the open-ended nature of the duty of loyalty (1) automatically 
equates the value of B’s lost expectation to that of F’s unauthorized gain. But, this is no answer 
to the economic approach that criticizes the very duty of loyalty as possibly causing economic 
inefficiency. In order to take up such criticism we now have to introduce the possibility that F’s 
unauthorized gain GF exceeds B’s lost expectation LB once again. 
The starting point of our “economic” justification of the fiduciary duty of loyalty is an 
observation that, as long as F’s unauthorized gain is larger than B’s lost expectation or GF > LB, 
there always exists an alternative allocation that is equal in terms of Kaldor efficiency but is 
superior in terms of Pareto optimality. Needless to say, a change in allocation is said to be 
“Pareto optimal” if it actually makes at least one person better off without making any other 
person worse off. Indeed, F had an option of not having placed himself as B’s fiduciary but 
purchased a “right” to serve B as a third party in the market. Of course, in such a situation 
somebody else, say f, would have had to take care of B as her fiduciary. (I will keep designating 
F as F, though he is no longer a fiduciary to B.) If we denote by P a price F would offer for 
such right, B’s net benefit and F’s net benefit would respectively become equal to UB
0+P and 
UF
0-P. Then, the set of inequalities (11) given in Chap. 5 can now be read as saying that, as 
long as F’s unauthorized gain is larger than B’s lost expectation, there always exists a price P 
that would give F an incentive to propose such a transaction, even if he were a self-seeking 
monster, and that would at the same time put f an obligation to accept F’s proposed transaction,   52 
in so far as he or she is a loyal fiduciary acting solely on B’s behalf. (Where the price P is 
actually set between GF and LB is determined by the relative bargaining strengths between F 
and f.) It goes without saying that, as any open transaction would do, such an open transaction 
between F and B through the intermediary of the latter’s loyal fiduciary f would automatically 
ensure the Pareto optimality and of course the Kaldor efficiency of the resulting allocation 
among all the parties involved including F as a third party, though it may fail to maximize the 




*≥ 0, and 
Uf ≥ 0.) By contrast, although F’s disloyalty to B would certainly be superior to F’s loyalty in 
terms of Kaldor efficiency even within the fiduciary relationship, it would fail to be so in terms 
of Pareto optimality. (For UB
0<UB





Note that, even if F tries to purchase from f the right to serve B as a third party, he may be 
outbid by another in the market. But, so much the better for the society, for then B’s property or 
power or information or other resources would be served by the more productive user, thereby 
promoting the society’s Pareto optimality further. 
I suppose that few trained in economics would object to our use of the notion of Pareto 
optimality as a standard of welfare comparison. I also believe that even the die-hard adherent 
of the economic approach to law would not reject the basic axiom I now propose – that if two 
alternative courses of action are equivalent in terms of Kaldor efficiency it is “wrong” to   53 
choose the one that is not Pareto optimal over the one that is.
77
Some may, however, still oppose to our argument on the ground analogous to “the the theory 
of efficiency breach” in contract law.
  As a matter of fact, the 
argument given above is a mere restatement of the first lesson in welfare economics that 
Kaldor efficiency is another name for “potential” Pareto optimality and that any Kaldor 
efficient allocation could be turned into a Pareto optimal one by actual transfer of monetary 
values from better-off persons to worse-off persons. 
78
In the case of fiduciary relationships as well, if B could always bring a suit against F in 
breach and give in evidence the amount of her lost expectation LB, and if courts could always 
verify F’s breach and set the damages D equal to B’s lost expectation, F’s self-seeking activity 
would bring about a Pareto optimal allocation (in a weak sense, though). F then has an 
incentive to breach his duty to B only when his unauthorized gain GF exceeds the damages LB 
he has to pay B. The resulting allocation would then be superior to the allocation under his 
  In the case of contractual relationships, Richard Posner 
(1998), for instance, wrote that “[if ] the profit from breach exceed his profits from completion 
of the contract,” and “[i]f it would also exceed the expected profit to the other party from 
completion of the contract, and if the damages are limited to the loss of that profit, there will be 
an incentive to commit a breach.” “But,” he then added, “there should be.” 
                                                 
77 I recognize that even Paretian criterion is not without criticisms – that it allows a wide disparity of incomes, that it is 
too weak to determine the unique optimal, that it may conflict with the minimum requirement of liberty, etc. All these 
criticisms are, I believe, legitimate, but not relevant to its use in this article. 
78 The concept of efficient breach was first introduced by Birmingham (1970). Its textbook account can be found in 
Posner (1998):133, Polinsky (2003): 29-41,63-69 and Cooter and Ulen (2008): 262-69.   54 
loyalty in terms of Pareto optimality, for that will leave F better off and make B not worse off 




*. One may call this the 
efficiency breach, or better, the Pareto optimal breach of fiduciary duty.   
It thus appears necessary for us, as practitioners of the economic approach to law would 
always do, to start comparing the associated transactions costs of the two principles that are 
equally capable of bringing about Pareto optimal allocations – the one that obliges fiduciaries 
to observe the duty of loyalty, purging all the self-seeking activities from inside of their 
relationship with beneficiaries, and the other that allows fiduciaries to exploit their relationship 
with beneficiaries to seek their own interests, so long as they can compensate the beneficiaries 
for their lost expectation.
79
                                                 
79 This comparison is analogous to the one between property rules and liability rules for the law of torts, especially, of 
intentional torts. See Calabresi and Melamed (1972) for the original formulation and Kaplow and Shavel (1996) for its 
critique. A property rule is a rule that allows no one to take things from another, unless she/he buys them at the price its 
possessor voluntarily agrees. A liability rule is a rule that allows anyone to take things from another, as long as she/he 
compensates the possessor for the court’s estimate of their value. In the case of fiduciary relationships, we have in 
Chap.5 deduced the property rule itself from the open-ended nature of the duty of loyalty, and we will show below the 
total  ineffectualness  of  the  liability  rule.          
  But such comparison is totally one-sided in the case of fiduciary 
relationships. As we have argued in Chap.6, it is often impossible, usually impractical, and 
almost always ineffectual to count on beneficiaries to bring a suit against disloyal fiduciaries, 
let alone prove the amount of her lost expectation, and it is again often impossible, usually 
impractical, and almost always ineffectual to rely on courts to verify the fact of fiduciary 
breach, let alone measure the correct amount of damages fiduciaries owe to beneficiaries. 
Those evidentiary problems and the associated transactions costs would multiply   55 
astronomically, once fiduciaries are allowed to breach the duty whenever they find it profitable 
to do so even after they pay compensatory damages. It would inevitably end up with nullifying 
the very remedial process of compensatory damages that is supposed to ensure the Pareto 
optimality of the Pareto optimal breach of fiduciary duty. Surely, even the disgorgement 
remedy (5) (that has now been subsumed by the compensatory remedy (4) under the duty of 
loyalty) may not be able to deter all the fiduciary breaches. But the fiduciary law has at least 
devised a way to minimize their occurrence by making the fiduciary liability strictly “strict,” 
thereby maximizing the likelihood of Pareto optimal outcomes. After a long detour we again 
find ourselves from where the present article started. For such one-sided comparison of 
transactions costs is after all a mere rehash of the raison d’être of the duty of loyalty. It is the 
absolute lack of capacity of one of the parties in relation to the other that inevitably turns their 
supposedly free contractual relationship into the latter’s self-contract that is not enforceable 
within the realm of contract law. The fiduciary law imposes on anyone who accepts the 
position of fiduciary the duty to act solely for the benefit of the other and makes that duty 
legally enforceable by inferring fiduciary’s breach solely from its external appearance.   
Note that in the opposite case where F’s unauthorized gain fails to exceed B’s lost 






*. It is thus “wrong” even from the standpoint of economic 
approach without invoking the notion of Pareto optimality.     56 
I think I am now able to claim even on the basis of “economic” analysis that no fiduciary 
should be allowed to seek his own interests at the expense of his beneficiary, no matter how 
beneficial that would be to the total efficiency of the relationship. If someone wishes to gain 
from a relationship with another person who lacks a capacity to form contract with him, he 
should not chose a fiduciary position as a means for his own enrichment but seek an 
opportunity to transact openly with her loyal fiduciary as a third party transactor outside of the 
relationship. (Or he should arrange a prior authorization in the form of trust instrument or 
articles of corporation or agency contract or partnership deed, or he should at least obtain either 
an informed consent of all the beneficiaries or, if that is impossible, an approval by the 
court.
80) The fiduciary’s unauthorized gain should thus be purged from the objective function 
of any fiduciary relationship, except in a side constraint that gives a minimum incentive for 




8. PARETO PRINCIPLE AS BRIDGE BETWEEN ECONOMIC APPROACH AND 
DEONTOLOGICAL APPROACH 
Our analysis of the fiduciary law, especially of its disgorgement remedy, has resulted in 
reviving the old-fashioned idea of corrective justice as a straightforward application of the 
                                                 
80 Bishop and Prentice (1983) provide an excellent discussion on these possibilities in their theoretical justification of the 
non-remuneration rule for trustees.  
81 Our theoretical objection to the Pareto optimal breach of fiduciary duty can be translated with suitable translation to 
the so-called “efficient theft” (See, e.g., Posner (1998): 225-269.) The present article, however, has no space to pursue 
this point further.   57 
“deontological” approach to law. We have, however, also been able to provide an “economic” 
justification for the fiduciary duty of loyalty as a rule that would necessarily promote Pareto 
optimality of the society as a whole. There is, however, nothing surprising about this, for the 
notion of Pareto optimality can be regarded as a common meeting ground between the two rival 
ethical principles -- utilitarianism and deontologism. While the notion of Pareto optimality is 
first and foremost a utilitarian standard that insists that the collective welfare of the society as a 
whole does not increase unless at least one person’s welfare increases and no one else’s 
decreases, it can also serve as a manifestation of deontological view of individual autonomy 
that “every person has an equal right not to have her or his welfare be sacrificed as the mere 
means of increasing the welfare of someone else” or of promoting some collective objective of 
the society.
82
                                                 
82 Kronman (1980): “This constraint expresses,” continues Kronman, “respect for the integrity of individuals, and 
distinguishes paretianism from every ethical theory – including utilitarianism – that treats the maximization of some 
impersonal good as an end in itself.” (488). I, however, do to subscribe to his distributive conception of contract law. 
  As long as the evaluative standard is Kaldor efficiency, there is no reason for the 
injurer to pay damages to the injured, for a loss of Kaldor efficiency is not a loss to any 
particular individual but a loss to the society at large. The notion of Pareto optimality, in 
contrast, takes the separateness of individuals seriously, so that whenever a loss occurs it is 
exclusively a loss to a particular individual or a particular set of individuals. Under the Pareto 
principle, therefore, if the injurer is obliged to pay damages for a loss he has caused it is the 
injured who has all the reason, indeed all the “right,” to be its sole recipient. This is what the 
corrective justice is all about.   58 
If there has been anything that can be agreed upon between advocates and opponents of 
economic approach to law, it is the utter uselessness of the notion of Pareto optimality as a 




  Yet we have now seen that it has served a key role in our “economic” justification 
of the duty of loyalty in fiduciary law. I hope that the present article would serve as a juncture 
between the economic approach and the corrective justice approach or, more generally, between 
the utilitarianism and the delontologism that have long been opposed with each other in 
economics, law, and other moral sciences. 
APPENDIX 1: A SIMPLE MATHEMATICAL MODEL OF DOCTOR’S 
INFORMATIONAL DOMINANCE OVER PATIENT 
Let x∈X be a medical condition of a patient (i.e., a beneficiary), a∈A a treatment by a doctor 
(i.e., a fiduciary), and y∈Y a medical result of such treatment. To simplify the exposition, X, A 
and Y are assumed to be discrete and finite. Medical science is not an exact science, and a 
causal relationship between a medical result y and a medical treatment a performed on the 
patient with a medical condition x can only be represented by a conditional probability 
Pr(y|a,x). Let uB(y) measure the net benefit the patient receives from a medical result y, and 
uF(a) the net benefit the doctor gains from performing a treatment a. Then, the “optimal” 
                                                 
83 On the side of economic approach, see, e.g., Calabresi (1991):1216-17; Posner (1998):15-17; Cooter and Ulen 
(2008): 378-380; and on the side of its opponents, see, e.g., Dworkin (1985): 238-240, and Coleman (1984): 651.   59 
treatment a
*(x) for the patient with x can be defined as the treatment that maximizes her 
expected net benefit: UB(a,x) ≡ Y y∈ Σ uB(y)Pr(y|a,x), subject to the doctor’s participation 
constraint: uF(a)≥0, or a
*(x) ≡  } 0 ) ( , { max arg ≥ ∈ a u A a F UB(a,x). (In order not to make our model 
trivial, a
*(x) is assumed to be sensitive to a change in x, in the sense that a
*(xi) ≠ a
*(xj) for any 
pair of xi and xj (≠ xi) in X.) The set of all the optimal treatments {a∈A| a=a
*(x) for some x∈X} 
will be denoted by A
*. 
Our basic premise is that the doctor dominates the patient informationally or that the doctor 
has finer information about a, x and y than the patient has. To simplify the analysis, I will 
suppose that, while both doctor and patient can observe a and y with certainty, only the doctor 
can observe x and understand its medical implications. This supposition differs from the 
standard assumption of asymmetric information in contract theory. True that doctor is better 
informed than patient is, but what he is better informed is not of his own action (as in the model 
of moral hazard) or of his own state (as in the model of adverse selection) but of the state of the 
patient he is dealing with. The most important fact is that such informational dominance 
endows the doctor with a power to choose a sub-optimal treatment a
0 without any fear of being 
detected by patient (as well as by courts) ex post, as long as he faithfully follows the following 
steps. First, make sure that a





0) for some x
0∈X. Next, make sure that every possible y of a treatment a
0 applied to a 
condition x can never be an impossible result of a
0 applied to a fictional x
0 for which a
0 is   60 
optimal; in other words, make sure that Pr(y|a
*(x
0),x
0)>0 for every y∈Y such that 
Pr(y|a
*(x
0),x)>0 for a true medical condition x. (Note that y is a “possible” result of a and x if 
Pr(y|a,x)> 0 and an “impossible” result if Pr(y|a,x)= 0.) Then, there remains no possibility that 
the doctor’s disloyalty will be exposed to the light of the day by any actual result y. The doctor 
never fails to justify himself by claiming to the patient that her medical condition was x
0 and his 
treatment a
0 is its optimal treatment a
*(x















*(x) is also contained in A
0(x).) It might be called “a set of exposure-proof 
pseudo-optimal treatments” for a medical condition x. A sufficient condition that A
0(x) contains 
at least one sub-optimal treatment a
0≠ a
*(x) is that anything can happen in medical treatment, or 
that Pr(y|a,x)>0 for any a∈A, x∈ X and y∈Y. In this case, A
0(x) extends to the whole A
*. A 
necessary and sufficient condition for A
0(x)= A
* independently of x is that Pr(y|a
*,x)>0 for any 
a
*∈A
*, x∈ X and y∈Y. As a rule of thumb, the larger the number of ys possible from a
*(x) and 
the smaller the number of ys possible from each a
0≠a
*(x), the larger A
0(x), hence the larger the 
doctor’s power to exploit his informational dominance over patient.   
A self-seeking doctor would then choose a treatment that would maximize his net benefit 
uF(a) within A
0(x). Let a













*(x)). Hence, the 
model in this Appendix is formally identical with the model set up in Chap. 3 of the main text.     61 
It should be emphasized here that, since UB
* and UB
0 are expected values, UB
*≥ UB
0 does not 
necessarily imply that a realized value of uB(y) under a
*(x) ≥ a realized value of uB(y) under 
a
0(x). Hence, an aggravation of symptoms is not always a sign of doctor’s disloyalty nor an 
improvement a proof of loyalty, as we have argued in Chap. 6.   
Note that the analysis given in this appendix can be applied with little modification to other 
professional relationships such as those between lawyer and client, priest and devotee, and fund 
manager and investor. 
      
APPENDIX 2: THE CASE WHERE INDIVIDUAL BENEFITS ARE NOT 
INTERPERSONALLY COMPARABLE 
Suppose that individual benefits UB and UF are not comparable between B and F. Let UF
0(–P) 
and UB
0(+P) denote their values when F first acts disloyally to B but later subsidizes a 
monetary amount P to B. For simplicity I assume that both UB
0(+P) and UF
0(–P) are continuous 
and increasing in +P and –P, respectively or that income effects are continuous and strictly 




0. Then, define a set Ω
0 of 
all the pairs of benefits that can be made equal in terms of Kaldor efficiency to the pairs of 
benefits under F’s disloyalty by means of F’s side-payment to B, or Ω
0≡ {(UB, UF) : UB= 
UB
0(+P) and UF=UF





0+P , and Ω
0={(UB,UF): UB+UF = UB
0+UF
0, UF≥UF
0},   62 
bringing us back to the model of the main text. 
I am now able to define B’s lost expectation LB (the amount of money that would put the 
injured party in as good a position as she would have been in but for the breach) and F’s 
unauthorized gain GF (the monetary equivalent to the gain he has obtained from his position as 
fiduciary without authorization by beneficiary or courts or the terms of arrangement) as 




*.   




(A2-2)  GF ≤ LB  ⇔  There is no (UB,UF) ε Ω
0 such that (UB,UF)> (UB
*,UF
*); in other 
words, (UB
0,UF
0) is not superior to (UB
*,UF
*) in terms of Kaldor efficiency.   
(A2-3)  GF > LB  ⇔  There is a (UB,UF) ε Ω
0 such that (UB,UF)> (UB
*,UF
*); in other words, 
(UB
0,UF
0) is superior to (UB
*,UF
*) in terms of Kaldor efficiency. 
All the results in the main text hold true even without interpersonal comparability of benefits. 
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